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Abstract
Using the Reinhart–Rogoff dataset, we find a debt threshold not around 90
per cent but around 30 per cent, above which the median real gross domestic
product (GDP) growth falls abruptly. Our work is the first to formally test for
threshold effects in the relationship between public debt and median real GDP
growth. The null hypothesis of no threshold effect is rejected at the 5 per cent
significance level for most cases. While we find no evidence of a threshold
around 90 per cent, our findings from the post-war sample suggest that the
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debt threshold for economic growth may exist around a relatively small debt-
to-GDP ratio of 30 per cent. Furthermore, countries with debt-to-GDP ratios
above 30 per cent have GDP growth that is 1 percentage point lower at the
median.
Policy points
 We find evidence supporting a debt-threshold effect around 30 per cent on
output growth using post-war cross-country data.
 More evidence is needed to establish causality between debt threshold and
growth.
I. Introduction
The effect of public debt on economic growth has been an important issue in the
recent policy debate on fiscal policies and in academia alike, particularly after
the recent financial crisis. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) successfully brought
this issue to a wide audience and many papers followed up the issue. One of
the central questions in this debate is that the effect of public debt measured by
the debt-to-GDP ratio can be heterogeneous for various reasons. For instance,
the effect could be different between the short run and the long run. Higher
public debt could stimulate the aggregate demand in the short run, which might
in turn crowd out private spending in the long run, resulting in reduced output.1
Another possibility is that the level of debt may have a highly nonlinear effect
on growth.2 Furthermore, the literature on public debt emphasises the issue of
sustainability – for example, ‘debt overhang’ in Krugman (1988) and ‘fiscal
fatigue’ in Ghosh et al. (2013).
We note that the effect of public debt on growth can be heterogeneous
in terms of both magnitude and nonlinearity, which leads us to consider a
median regression approach to complement the existing literature that is based
on mean regression models. In this paper, we test whether there is a threshold
effect in the relationship between government debt-to-GDP ratio and median
real GDP growth rate in advanced economies by applying a recently developed
econometric technique to the Reinhart–Rogoff (RR hereafter) dataset.
Our paper is primarily motivated by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) whose
‘main result is that whereas the link between growth and debt seems relatively
weak at “normal” debt levels, median growth rates for countries with public
debt over roughly 90 per cent of GDP are about a 1 percentage point lower than
otherwise; average (mean) growth rates are several per cent lower’. Herndon,
Ash and Pollin (2014) pointed out their spreadsheet errors and claimed that
1Eberhardt and Presbitero, 2015; Chudik et al., 2017.
2Mauro et al., 2015.
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‘overall evidence refutes RR’s claim that public debt/GDP ratios above 90
per cent consistently reduce a country’s GDP growth’. In the response to their
critics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2013bb) stressed among other things that their
paper ‘gave significant weight to the median estimates’ because these are less
influenced by outliers.
A substantial body of literature since then has been devoted to testing for
the threshold effect in the link between public debt and GDP growth but a
general consensus has not been reached. Kumar and Woo (2010), Cecchetti,
Mohanty and Zampolli (2011), Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) and
Baum, Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2013) obtained evidence supporting
the proposed 90 per cent debt threshold. Minea and Parent (2012) estimated a
higher debt threshold, around 115 per cent of GDP. However, Caner, Grennes
and Koehler-Geib (2010) and Elmeskov and Sutherland (2012) found the
threshold to be around 70 per cent. Hansen (2017) detected the regression kink
around 40 per cent. Baglan and Yoldas (2013) and Égert (2015) suggested that
the threshold may be even lower, around 20 per cent. For a more comprehensive
literature review, refer to Panizza and Presbitero (2013) and Eberhardt and
Presbitero (2015). However, the aforementioned papers in the literature did
not estimate or test for the threshold effect in terms of the median GDP growth
rate, although Reinhart and Rogoff emphasised their median estimates. To the
best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to focus on the median real GDP
growth.
In this paper, we contribute to the Reinhart and Rogoff debate by formally
testing for a threshold effect in the relationship between public debt and median
real GDP growth. The goal of this paper is to examine whether the empirical
findings of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) can be viewed as statistically significant
evidence for the existence of the threshold effect around 90 per cent of the
debt-to-GDP ratio. Although the debate broadly encompasses the link between
debt and growth in all economies, we restrict our attention to threshold effects
in advanced economies in this paper using the updated RR dataset.3 We have
found that there is a threshold effect around 30 per cent of the debt-to-GDP
ratio. Furthermore, countries with debt-to-GDP ratios above 30 per cent have
GDP growth that is 1 percentage point lower at the median.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II, we
describe the set-up and the methodology. In Section III, we explain the data
and give estimation results of median regression. In Section IV, we present the
main testing results, and in Section V, we provide the results of the robustness
check. We conclude in Section VI. In the Online Appendix, we describe the
construction of the sample used in our empirical work and we provide details
of the testing method.
3Reinhart and Rogoff (2013a).
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II. The set-up and methodology
We use the updated RR dataset4 and apply the test for the threshold effect
developed in Lee, Seo and Shin (2011). This method allows us to test for the
threshold effect in the median regression model when the threshold value is
unknown.
1. Model specification
Let yc,t be the real GDP of country c for year t . Let Gc,t−1,t be the
real GDP growth of the country between the years t and t − 1, that is,
100 × (yc,t − yc,t−1)/yc,t−1. Similarly, let Gc,t,t+5 be its five-year forward
average growth rate (annualised five-year growth hereafter) defined as
(1/5)
∑4
s=0 Gc,t+s,t+s+1. The annualised five-year growth is defined so that the
period included does not overlap with the period for annual growth. Let debtc,t
denote the debt-to-GDP ratio of country c in year t expressed in percentage.
Our main interest is how the debt-to-GDP ratio of a country affects its
annual and annualised five-year growth rates. Specifically, we wish to test
whether there is a debt-to-GDP ratio threshold after which the median growth
rates change abruptly. The conditional median function is specified as
Median(gc,t |debtc,t ) = β1 + β2debtc,t(1)
+ [α1 + α2debtc,t ] × I (debtc,t > γ ),
where gc,t can be either Gc,t−1,t or Gc,t,t+5, I (·) is an indicator function and
α1, α2, β1, β2 and γ are unknown true parameter values that belong to
A1,A2,B1,B2 and , respectively, which are subsets of the real line, R.5
Note that two outcome variables Gc,t−1,t and Gc,t,t+5 capture possibly different
effects of debt on growth because the economic channels through which debt
affects contemporary growth could be different from the channels for future
growth.
We consider two specifications for the regression model. For the ‘intercept-
only’ model, we consider a conditional median function where only the
intercept is allowed to change at the threshold value by imposing α2 = 0. For
the ‘intercept-and-slope’ model, changes in both the slope and the intercept
4Reinhart and Rogoff (2013a).
5Note that the average five-year growth rate is taken within a country, but the median regression in
the paper is concerned with comparison across countries over time. Therefore, it is possible to consider
the average five-year growth rate as the dependent variable in equation 1. Alternatively, one can consider
the median five-year growth rate as the dependent variable. This would correspond to a different median
regression model.
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are allowed at the threshold value. It follows from equation 1 that the partial
effect of debt on growth is given by
∂Median(gc,t |debtc,t )
∂debtc,t
= β2 + α2 × I (debtc,t > γ ).(2)
Thus, in the intercept-only model, the partial effect of debt is constant,
regardless of the existence of the threshold effect, whereas, in the intercept-
and-slope model, if the threshold effect exists, the partial effect is β2 if the
level of debt is below the threshold but β2 + α2 if it is above the threshold. In
other words, α2 represents the change in the slope coefficient below and above
the threshold.
Let α = [α1, α2]. The null and alternative hypotheses in our setting are
H0 : α = 0 for any γ ∈  versus H1 : α = 0 for some γ ∈ .(3)
When α = 0, there is no threshold effect due to the debt-to-GDP ratio, whereas,
if α = 0, there exists a threshold effect. The implication of rejecting the null
hypothesis H0 is different between the two specifications. In the intercept-only
model, rejecting H0 means that there is a jump in the intercept term only, while,
in the intercept-and-slope model, it implies that there is a change either in the
intercept or in the slope (or both).
2. Informal description of the testing procedure
There are several testing procedures available in the literature: a sup-likelihood-
ratio-type test of Lee, Seo and Shin (2011), a sup-Wald-type test of Galvao
et al. (2014) and a sup-score-type test of Zhang, Wang and Zhu (2014). In
this paper, we use the sup-likelihood-ratio-type test of Lee, Seo and Shin
(2011) as, in many cases, likelihood ratio tests are known to have desirable
properties.
In our analysis, we pool observations as if observations were independent
and identically distributed over c and t . In what follows, we use the subscript
i for each country–year observation. This is a convenient assumption to start
with, but it is also expected that the asymptotic null distribution of the sup-
likelihood-ratio test statistic is the same for stationary weakly dependent
processes, as is the case with the sup-Wald-type test of Galvao et al.
(2014).6
6Lee, Seo and Shin (2011) did not consider dependent observations; however, we expect that the
asymptotically valid p-value can be obtained in the same way as described in this paper, in view of the
asymptotic equivalence result obtained in Galvao et al. (2014) for the sup-Wald-type test.
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To give an informal description of our testing procedure, we start with the
following objective function for the median regression:




× |gi − {β1 + β2debti + [α1 + α2debti ] × I (debti > γ )}| .
For a given γ ∈ , define α̂(γ ) and β̂(γ ) to be the estimators that maximise
the objective function Qn(α, β, γ ). Let γ̂ := argmaxγ∈ Qn(α̂(γ ), β̂(γ ), γ )
and
Q̂n := Qn(α̂(γ̂ ), β̂(γ̂ ), γ̂ ).
In addition, noting that Qn(α, β, γ ) does not depend on γ when α = 0 , let
β̂ := argmaxβ:α=0 Qn(α, β, γ ) and Q̃n := Qn(0, β̃, γ ).
Define the quasi-likelihood ratio statistic by
QL Rn := n(Q̂n − Q̃n).(4)
In other words, our test statistic is based on the distance between maximised
restricted and unrestricted objective function values. Note that the test statistic
defined in equation 4 can also be written as
QL Rn = supγ∈ n[Qn(α̂(γ ), β̂(γ ), γ ) − Q̃n].
Thus, the statistic QL Rn can be viewed as a sup-likelihood-ratio-type
statistic. We can simulate valid p-values of the quasi-likelihood ratio test,
following Lee, Seo and Shin (2011). To implement the test, it is necessary to
specify the range of the parameter space  of the threshold parameter γ . In all
empirical results presented below, we set  to be an interval between 10 and
120 per cent of GDP, to include the range of debt thresholds estimated in the
previous literature. See the Online Appendix for a detailed description of how
to obtain the p-value.
III. Data and median regression results
The dataset comes from Reinhart and Rogoff (2013a).7 This is a revised and
corrected version of the data used in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). For the
7See http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/.
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main analysis, we use the post-war sample of ‘advanced economies’. The
sample covers the years 1946–2009 and includes the following countries:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. The specific
country–years included in the sample are described in the Online Appendix.
For the GDP growth of New Zealand, Reinhart and Rogoff (2013a)
constructed two different sets of data: first, from Angus Maddison’s Database
and, then, from the New Zealand Historical Statistics records. We only report
the results obtained using the New Zealand Historical Statistics data. We have
also conducted the same tests with the Maddison data and the differences in
the results are minor.
Before moving to the test results, we present the predicted values from
median regression of growth on dummy variables that represent debt-to-GDP
ratio categories. We use the same debt categories as Reinhart and Rogoff
(2010). However, we assign an equal weight to every country–year observation
for the whole sample, while they assign an equal weight to every country within
a debt category (i.e., the equal weight within each subsample defined by the
debt level). In our test for threshold effects, because we test for the existence
of any threshold rather than a particular threshold, we do not have ex-ante debt
categories needed to construct the weights used in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010).
Hence, for consistency, we use country–year equal weights in estimation of
median regression.
Figure 1 depicts the predicted median growth and the region within two
standard deviations from the predicted median growth. We can observe that
the difference in predicted median growth between the categories ‘under 30’
FIGURE 1
Median regression of growth on debt categories
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and ‘30 to 60’ is larger than the difference between the categories ‘60 to 90’
and ‘over 90’ for both panels.
IV. Test results for threshold effects
Table 1 describes the result of the tests for the threshold effect in median
annual growth regression and the estimation results for both the restrictive and
unrestrictive models. In panel A, the null hypothesis of no threshold effect is
rejected in both specifications at the 5 per cent significance level. The estimated
threshold is 28 per cent.
In panel B, we report estimation results for the restricted model where
α = 0 is imposed. The restricted model is simply a standard linear median
regression model. The standard errors are given in parentheses. In this model,
a 10 percentage point increase in the debt is associated with a 0.22 percentage
point decrease in median GDP growth.
In panel C, we estimate the unrestricted model with the estimated threshold
parameter (γ̂ = 28).8 In the unrestricted model, the estimated drop in growth at
the threshold debt level (28 per cent) is 1 percentage point in the intercept-only
model and 0.8 percentage point in the intercept-and-slope model. For the latter
TABLE 1







β̃1 4.331 (0.148) 4.331 (0.148)
β̃2 −0.022 (0.002) −0.022 (0.002)
C. Unrestricted model
β̂1 4.540 (0.178) 4.275 (0.459)
β̂2 −0.009 (0.004) 0.005 (0.025)
α̂1 −1.074 (0.242) −0.809 (0.516)
α̂2 −0.015 (0.026)
Note: For the ‘intercept-only’ model, we consider a conditional median function where only the intercept is
allowed to change at the threshold value by imposing α2 = 0. For the ‘intercept-and-slope’ model, changes in
both the slope and the intercept are allowed at the threshold value. β̃1 and β̃2 refer to the estimated coefficients
for β = (β1, β2) when the restriction α = 0 is imposed. The standard errors are given in parentheses.
8When α = 0, the threshold parameter can be estimated at a rate of n − 1 when the sample n goes to
infinity. This implies that standard errors for the (β, α) coefficients can be obtained as if γ were known.
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model, the estimated β2 and α2 are 0.005 and –0.015, respectively. However,
both coefficients are insignificant at any conventional level.
If we look at country–year observations, countries can be grouped roughly
into three groups. One group consists of Belgium, Canada, the UK and the US.
For these countries, except for Canada, no observation has a debt level below
28 per cent in the study period.9 The second group is composed of Australia,
Ireland, New Zealand and Norway. They experienced most years in the 2000s
under the debt threshold. The third group is made up of residual countries that
enjoyed a substantial period of low debt but moved to the regime above the
threshold and stayed there at the end of study period.
Table 2 describes the result of the tests for threshold effect in median
annualised five-year growth regression. The null hypothesis of no threshold
effect is rejected in both specifications at any conventional level. The estimated
threshold is 32 per cent in the intercept-only model and 18 per cent in the
intercept-and-slope model. In the restricted model where α = 0 is imposed, a
10 percentage point increase in debt is associated with a 0.12 percentage point
decrease in median GDP growth. The estimated coefficients suggest that the
negative impact of debt on growth is smaller in future growth compared to
contemporaneous growth.
In the unrestricted intercept-only model, the estimated drop in growth
at the threshold debt level is 0.9 percentage point, which is similar to the
results in Table 1. For the unrestricted intercept-and-slope model, the estimated
TABLE 2








β̃1 3.866 (0.103) 3.866 (0.103)
β̃2 −0.012 (0.002) −0.012 (0.002)
C. Unrestricted model
β̂1 3.992 (0.091) 2.101 (0.363)
β̂2 −0.003 (0.001) 0.178 (0.033)
α̂1 −0.909 (0.132) −1.374 (0.376)
α̂2 −0.184 (0.033)
Note: The note from Table 1 applies.
9Only two years were below the threshold for Canada (27 per cent in 2007 and 23 per cent in 2008).
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regression line below the 18 per cent threshold is 2.101 + 0.178 × debtc,t and
that above the threshold is 3.475 − 0.006 × debtc,t . One can interpret that
the 18 per cent threshold is a future-growth-maximising optimal debt ratio
threshold. However, we need to be careful in drawing this conclusion as our
estimation results are not causal but merely descriptive.
V. Robustness of results
In this section, we check the robustness of our results in three different ways:
(i) by searching for the second threshold effect in the subsamples divided by
the initial threshold estimate; (ii) by omitting one or more countries from the
original sample; (iii) by adding the lagged dependent variable as an additional
covariate.
First, we examine whether there is a second threshold below or above the
threshold estimated in the previous section. One might bring out the possibility
of multiple thresholds in the link between debt and growth, and might justly
question whether there is really no evidence of a 90 per cent debt threshold.
It is possible that there is another threshold around 90 per cent in samples
where the estimated threshold is around 30 per cent, but the effect is not strong
enough to be detected. There are fewer observations with debt around 90 per
cent than those with debt around 30 per cent in the sample. Thus, it might be
more difficult to detect a threshold around 90 per cent compared to around
30 per cent.
To examine this issue, we plot the profiled values Qn(α̂(γ ), β̂(γ ), γ ) of the
objective function for each fixed value of γ in Figures 2 and 3. In Figure 2, there
seems to be a second peak near the upper end point of the parameter space;
however, with relatively few observations above 100 per cent, it is difficult
FIGURE 2
Qn(α̂(γ ), β̂(γ ), γ ) for annual growth
Note: Each panel of the figure plots the profiled value Qn(α̂(γ ), β̂(γ ), γ ) of the objective function for each
fixed value of γ .
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FIGURE 3
Qn(α̂(γ ), β̂(γ ), γ ) for five-year growth
TABLE 3
Test for second threshold effect in median annual real GDP growth function:
debt-to-GDP below or above the first threshold, ‘intercept-only’






β̃1 4.275 (0.508) 3.466 (0.236)
β̃2 0.005 (0.028) −0.009 (0.004)
to conclude whether a threshold really exists there. Likewise, in Figure 3,
evidence supporting the presence of another threshold around 90 per cent is
weak.
To complement the eyeball examination of figures, in Tables 3 and 4, we
report the test results using two subsamples constructed by including only
the observations with debt-to-GDP ratios below or above the estimated first
threshold. Because the possibility of the second peak is more pronounced for
annual growth (see Figures 2 and 3), we only present test results using annual
growth as the dependent variable. Table 3 reports test results for the intercept-
only model and Table 4 shows those for the intercept-and-slope model.
We can observe that the null hypothesis of no threshold effect is not rejected
at the 5 per cent significance level for any case. For example, if we look at
the subsample above the 28 per cent threshold, there are 769 observations
and the estimated threshold parameter is 77 per cent in both intercept-only
and intercept-and-slope specifications. However, in either specification, the
C© 2017 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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TABLE 4
Test for second threshold effect in median annual real GDP growth function:
debt-to-GDP below or above the first threshold, ‘intercept-and-slope’






β̃1 4.275 (0.508) 3.466 (0.236)
β̃2 0.005 (0.028) −0.009 (0.004)
p-value is not small enough to provide any significant test result. This suggests
that there could be a second threshold around 77 per cent but we fail to find any
statistically significant evidence. Because the evidence supporting the second
threshold effect is weak, we only report estimation results for the restricted
model in Tables 3 and 4. Note that the slope coefficient for the subsample
consisting of observations below the 28 per cent threshold is modestly positive
but insignificant, whereas the slope coefficient above the threshold is –0.009
and significant at the 5 per cent level.
Second, we check whether the results depend on the inclusion/exclusion of
any particular country by carrying out the tests with country-wise subsamples.
To that end, we first generate subsamples by omitting one country each
time from the original sample. We next generate subsamples by splitting the
countries into two groups according to alphabetical order (10 countries in each
group) or region (16 European countries and four non-European countries).
Tables 5 and 6 describe the results. We can confirm that the results are scarcely
affected by one-country omissions. When the countries are split into two
groups, the estimated threshold points are similar, but the results are only
significant for the group of European countries.
To check for the possibility of a second threshold among European
countries, we repeated the same exercises as in Tables 3 and 4 for European
countries only. The corresponding test results are given in Table 7. It can be seen
that the empirical results in Tables 3 and 4 are more or less replicated in Table 7.
Finally, we consider further tests by adding the lagged dependent variable
as an explanatory variable when the dependent variable is annual growth. We
consider the following three specifications:
Median(Gc, t−1, t |debtc, t )(5)
= β1 + β2debtc, t + β3Gc, t−2, t−1 + α1 × I (debtc, t > γ ),
C© 2017 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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TABLE 5
Tests for threshold effects in median annual GDP growth functions, ‘intercept-only’
p-value γ̂ β̃1 β̃2 β̂1 β̂2 α̂1
Country omitted
Australia 0.001 28 4.372 −0.023 4.735 −0.010 −1.291
Austria 0.038 28 4.313 −0.021 4.454 −0.010 −0.950
Belgium 0.004 28 4.341 −0.023 4.538 −0.009 −1.117
Canada 0.002 28 4.366 −0.023 4.549 −0.010 −1.134
Denmark 0.020 28 4.395 −0.022 4.587 −0.011 −0.991
Finland 0.005 28 4.396 −0.023 4.600 −0.010 −1.106
France 0.048 28 4.284 −0.021 4.380 −0.009 −0.907
Germany 0.003 28 4.396 −0.022 4.607 −0.010 −1.123
Greece 0.035 28 4.401 −0.024 4.574 −0.013 −0.899
Ireland 0.020 28 4.342 −0.023 4.518 −0.010 −1.039
Italy 0.006 28 4.244 −0.019 4.367 −0.007 −1.006
Japan 0.006 28 4.250 −0.021 4.299 −0.004 −1.146
The Netherlands 0.006 28 4.353 −0.022 4.555 −0.009 −1.095
New Zealand 0.009 28 4.353 −0.022 4.557 −0.010 −1.073
Norway 0.000 29 4.395 −0.023 4.595 −0.009 −1.199
Portugal 0.025 28 4.279 −0.021 4.442 −0.010 −0.958
Spain 0.010 28 4.326 −0.022 4.504 −0.009 −1.083
Sweden 0.011 28 4.353 −0.022 4.541 −0.010 −1.057
United Kingdom 0.064 28 4.409 −0.023 4.562 −0.012 −0.927
United States 0.003 28 4.326 −0.022 4.536 −0.009 −1.145
Countries included
Australia–Ireland 0.522 24 4.023 −0.013 4.098 0.004 −1.322
Italy–United States 0.036 17 4.620 −0.029 6.352 −0.026 −1.951
European 0.001 28 4.267 −0.021 4.300 −0.001 −1.388
Non-European 0.012 13 5.316 −0.036 8.492 −0.016 −4.513
Median(Gc, t−1, t |debtc, t )(6)
= β1 + β2debtc, t + β3Gc, t−2, t−1 + [α1 + α2debtc, t ]
×I (debtc, t > γ ),
Median(Gc, t−1, t |debtc, t )(7)
= β1 + β2debtc, t + β3Gc, t−2, t−1 + [α1 + α2debtc, t
+ α3Gc, t−2, t−1] × I (debtc, t > γ ).
Table 8 indicates that the threshold effect seems to disappear altogether. The
test fails to reject the null hypothesis in all cases at the 5 per cent significance
C© 2017 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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TABLE 6
Tests for threshold effects in median annual GDP growth functions,
‘intercept-and-slope’
p-value γ̂ β̃1 β̃2 β̃1 β̃2 α̂1 α̂2
Country omitted
Australia 0.005 28 4.372 −0.023 4.844 −0.017 −1.428 0.008
Austria 0.105 28 4.313 −0.021 4.172 0.009 −0.587 −0.020
Belgium 0.015 28 4.341 −0.023 4.275 0.005 −0.855 −0.014
Canada 0.016 28 4.366 −0.023 4.222 0.008 −0.807 −0.018
Denmark 0.071 28 4.395 −0.022 4.526 −0.008 −0.910 −0.004
Finland 0.024 28 4.396 −0.023 4.489 −0.004 −0.996 −0.006
France 0.141 28 4.284 −0.021 4.264 −0.002 −0.791 −0.008
Germany 0.017 28 4.396 −0.022 4.040 0.021 −0.480 −0.032
Greece 0.109 28 4.401 −0.024 4.248 0.006 −0.573 −0.019
Ireland 0.068 28 4.342 −0.023 4.594 −0.015 −1.115 0.005
Italy 0.047 28 4.244 −0.019 4.633 −0.019 −1.298 0.013
Japan 0.010 28 4.250 −0.021 3.885 0.025 −0.596 −0.031
The Netherlands 0.020 28 4.353 −0.022 4.286 0.005 −0.826 −0.014
New Zealand 0.029 28 4.353 −0.022 4.286 0.005 −0.767 −0.015
Norway 0.005 28 4.395 −0.023 4.366 0.006 −0.946 −0.015
Portugal 0.084 28 4.279 −0.021 4.212 0.006 −0.709 −0.016
Spain 0.041 28 4.326 −0.022 4.655 −0.019 −1.234 0.010
Sweden 0.036 28 4.353 −0.022 4.248 0.006 −0.729 −0.016
United Kingdom 0.332 28 4.409 −0.023 4.275 0.005 −0.616 −0.017
United States 0.009 28 4.326 −0.022 4.275 0.005 −0.884 −0.014
Countries included
Australia–Ireland 1.000 24 4.023 −0.013 3.960 0.018 −1.155 −0.015
Italy–United States 0.218 13 4.620 −0.029 11.018 −0.700 −6.444 0.673
European 0.002 28 4.267 −0.021 3.709 0.035 −0.551 −0.040
Non-European 0.135 13 5.316 −0.036 9.899 −0.145 −5.920 0.130
TABLE 7
Test for second threshold effect in median annual real GDP growth function:
debt-to-GDP below or above the first threshold, using only European countries
Intercept-only Intercept-and-slope
Below 28 Above 28 Below 28 Above 28
A. Test result
n 383 562 383 562
p-value 0.759 0.156 0.773 0.449
γ̂ 17 77 11 77
B. Restricted model
β̃1 3.709 (0.535) 3.157 (0.271) 3.709 (0.535) 3.157 (0.271)
β̃2 0.035 (0.029) −0.006 (0.005) 0.035 (0.029) −0.006 (0.005)
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TABLE 8
Test for threshold effect in median annual real GDP growth function with lagged
dependent variable
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
A. Test result
n 1,161 1,161 1,161
p-value 0.105 0.220 0.220
γ̂ 28 28 77
B. Restricted model
β̃1 2.104 (0.161) 2.104 (0.161) 2.104 (0.161)
β̃2 −0.008 (0.002) −0.008 (0.002) −0.008 (0.002)
β̃3 0.475 (0.025) 0.475 (0.025) 0.475 (0.025)
Note: β̃3 is the coefficient that corresponds to the lagged dependent variable.
level. The coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is around 0.5 and highly
significant. The estimation results imply that a 10 percentage point increase in
the debt is associated with 0.08 percentage point decrease in annual growth.
This result further casts doubt on the existence of a threshold effect around 90
per cent of the debt-to-GDP ratio. In summary, we do not find any credible
evidence to support the existence of a threshold around 90 per cent in median
regression.
VI. Conclusion
After testing for threshold effects in the link between public debt-to-GDP ratio
and median growth, we find no evidence of the threshold effect at 90 per cent
of the debt-to-GDP ratio that is generally applicable to all countries. Instead,
our findings suggest that a debt threshold, if it exists, may be around 30 per
cent of GDP. However, more evidence is needed to establish any credible link
between such debt threshold and growth.
Our paper has some limitations. Although we carry out formal hypothesis
testing for the existence of a debt threshold, our work is simply descriptive
by its nature. As a result, we do not consider the issue of causality in the
debt–growth relationship. One could perhaps investigate the issue of causality
by exploiting panel data with a structural econometric model that is guided by
economic theory. In addition, it might be fruitful to allow for country-specific
heterogeneity in the debt–growth relationship. Country-specific variations in
macro-economic variables such as inflation and interest rates might provide
the key to uncover economic channels through which public debt affects
growth.10 These are important future research topics.
10For example, see Crafts (2016) regarding the UK’s experience.
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